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 RISING SEAS AND COMMON LAW BASELINES: A 
COMMENT ON REGULATORY TAKINGS DISCOURSE 
CONCERNING CLIMATE CHANGE 
J. Peter Byrne 
This essay examines adaptation of property law to rapid changes in 
resource character through climate change.  My jurisprudential concern is 
with judicial disfavoring of legislative adjustments of common law 
entitlements.  My doctrinal concern focuses on regulatory takings 
challenges to legislative programs to adapt to rising sea levels.  Legal 
adaptation to fast and large changes in resources, such as through sea level 
rise, will require inventive legislation.  It already has become a cliché that 
climate change changes everything.  But some courts privilege common 
law rights over legislative realignment, invoking the Takings Clause or 
other constitutional provisions.  This essay will examine this problem in the 
context of current cases wrestling with legislation that purports to govern 
the allocation of rights to beaches between private owners and the public. 
Sea levels have been rising at an accelerating rate in recent years.1  
Substantial sea level rise is nearly certain to occur in subsequent decades as 
a consequence of global warming regardless of what mitigation measures 
government or private citizens adopt.2  Public and private land will 
                                                                                                                                         
 
  Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  Thanks for research help goes to 
Peter Amaro. 
 1. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS 
REPORT 30–31 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. 
 2. David A. Farenthold, Rise in Sea Level Threatens Atlantic Coastline, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 
2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/27/AR2009102703915.html. 
The Virginia Governor’s Commission on Climate Change, for example, predicted that the 
Commonwealth will face 2.3 to 5.2 feet of sea level rise, which will result in increased flooding and 
storm surge in vulnerable coastal areas.  GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FINAL REPORT: A 
CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN 5–7 (2008), available at 
http://www.deq.virginia.gov/export/sites/default/info/documents/climate/CCC_Final_Report-
Final_12152008.pdf.  A recent paper argues, based upon a study of sea level rises during the last 
interglacial period, that seas may rise during the current warming trend by twenty to thirty feet on 
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disappear beneath the waves and buildings will be destroyed.  More severe 
storms may well aggravate the loss of land and buildings.  The mean high 
tide line, which typically marks the division between public trust tidelands 
and privately owned dry land, will move inland.3  Under traditional 
common law rules governing erosion, the migration of the mean high tide 
line will change ownership of locations from private owners to the public.4  
The seas will engulf wetlands, which may establish themselves in locations 
formerly dry and inland.  Private owners, of course, have the incentive to 
resist these outcomes, either through armoring the shore or through legal 
arguments.  Public officials will have complex incentives and duties: 
protecting environmental resources (such as dunes and wetlands), securing 
public rights, promoting economic development, and satisfying 
constituents, including littoral property owners.  But the dramatic changes 
being brought about by climate change will require rapid developments in 
rules based upon scientific understandings and the balancing of competing 
interests that legislatures accomplish better than courts. 
Because my underlying concern in this essay is jurisprudential, I will 
not argue here for any particular regulatory approach for adapting to rising 
sea levels.  Instead, I will consider three approaches, all of which reflect 
recent judicial decisions or legislative proposals.  First is public financing 
of beach restoration accompanied by fixing the formerly mobile line 
between public and private land.  This is the approach at issue in Stop the 
Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection.5  
Second is the advance inland, or “rolling,” of public easements over 
eroding, formerly unburdened private land.  This is the problem addressed 
in Severance v. Patterson.6  The third scenario considers plausible 
proposals to enact legislation that restricts the ability of private landowners 
to erect seawalls or other structures meant to protect their land from 
                                                                                                                                         
average.  Robert E. Kopp et al, Probabilistic Assessment of Sea Level During the Last Interglacial Stage, 
462 NATURE 863 (2009). 
 3. James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to Save 
Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279, 1365–66 (1998). 
 4. HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 320–23 (The Lawbook 
Exchange, Ltd. 2006) (1904). 
 5. Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1106 (Fla. 2008), 
cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3673 (U.S. June 15, 2009) (No. 08-1151) (At the Supreme Court level, the 
party names are now Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection.). 
 6. Severance v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 490, 493, 503–04 (5th Cir. 2009). 
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inundation and the passing to public ownership due to sea level rise.  Meg 
Caldwell proposes something to this effect in a recent 7 article.  
                                                                                                                                         
Each of these three scenarios raises regulatory takings issues.  In 
decisions addressing these issues, courts have placed weight on whether 
public restraints on private rights accord with the common law.  This strikes 
me as unjustified. Such judicial attitudes threaten the ability of the 
appropriate public authorities to respond to sea level rise in an 
environmentally responsible manner.  The question should not be whether 
the common law once treated seaside rights in a certain way, but whether 
contemporary legislation is fair to all interested parties. 
This paper analyzes the takings implications of different legal 
adaptations to sea level rise, with particular attention to the normative 
precedence given to common law rights.  The weight given to common law 
rights over legislative regulation may be endemic to the regulatory takings 
area because legislation modifies the common law but not vice versa.  But 
judicial privileging of common law baselines took on another dimension in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council, where the Court used them as 
“background principles” that provided a crucial measure of the 
constitutional authority of legislatures.8  Unfairness to owners from 
reasonably unanticipated changes in the law is a long-standing element in 
regulatory takings analysis, but more seems to be at issue here.  Courts 
seem to be moved by a more general concern about whether limitations on 
use can be said to “inhere in the title,” or should be viewed merely as 
political constraints external to the title. 
In another paper, I have argued that the character of many common law 
property rules reflect more the institutional limitations of the common law 
than a fixed normative judgment about the content of those rules.9  The 
resources of modern legislation and ongoing administrative regulation 
broaden the capacity of the government to register and reflect a broader 
array of interests and values than common law courts could manage.  Thus, 
I argued that common law courts refused to recognize security interests in 
 7. Meg Caldwell & Craig Holt Segall, No Day at the Beach: Sea Level Rise, Ecosystem Loss, 
and Public Access Along the California Coast, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 566–67 (2007). 
 8. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). Lucas is discussed further 
below. 
 9. J. Peter Byrne, The Public Nature of Property Rights and the Property Nature of Public 
Law, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (Michael Diamond ed., forthcoming 2010) 
(manuscript at 4, on file with author). 
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personal property or protect a resident’s interest in existing natural light, for 
example, not because these claims were normatively unattractive, but 
because they could not be protected in common law adjudication without 
daunting negative consequences.  Legislative and administrative 
innovations effectively solved these problems through establishing a 
recording system for security interests in personal property and through 
zoning setbacks and height limitations, both protecting a broader array of 
interests with reasonable efficiency.  My claim was not that legislative 
adjustments of property rights are always superior to common law rules, but 
that they are legitimate parts of property law and have capacities to 
recognize a broader array of interests, manage information to prevent 
private losses, and adjust private rights to public needs. 
Let us turn to the current cases that illustrate the courts’ fixation on the 
common law origins of old law.  At bottom, Stop the Beach Renourishment 
challenges the constitutionality of Florida’s Beach and Shore Preservation 
Act.10  Under the Act, the State, at the request and with the assistance of the 
relevant local government, restores eroded beaches at public expense.11  As 
part of the process, the state fixes a new boundary between the tidal public 
trust lands and adjacent private littoral lands, based on the historic mean 
high tide line.12  After the boundary is fixed, the property line does not 
move seaward or landward so long as the state maintains the restored 
beach.13  The purpose of this is obvious.  It would be absurd for the state to 
pay to restore the beach if much of the new land was to become privately 
owned.  This program does confer substantial benefits on private littoral 
owners.  The restored beach protects their adjacent land from erosion and 
storm damage.  The Act also provides specific legal protections to the 
littoral owners, such as guarantees of their unimpeded views of and access 
to the sea.14  No private land actually is taken, as the beach has to be eroded 
to qualify for restoration, and the new dry land was previously under water.  
The private owner litigants claim that the Act deprives them of the property 
right to obtain future increases from accretion.15 
                                                                                                                                         
 10. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.011–161.76 (2006); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 
So. 2d at 1107. 
 11. § 161.26. 
 12. § 161.141. 
 13. § 161.191. 
 14. § 161.201. 
 15. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d at 1107. 
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Stop the Beach Renourishment challenges as a “judicial taking” the 
Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of its precedent in arriving at the 
conclusion that the littoral owners never had a distinct right at common law 
to own future accretions.16  While there are numerous problems with a 
judicial takings theory based on state court interpretation of state common 
law,17 I want to focus on the framing of the case around the Florida 
common law baseline.  The Florida Supreme Court felt that it needed to 
parse the common law rights of the private owners, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to determine whether that parsing violated the 
federal constitution.18  But none of this should matter.  The Act plainly 
changed the way that the boundaries of the littoral lands would be 
determined and did so to enable a new approach to reversing beach erosion 
based on modern technology, fairly balancing private and public interests.  
There is no suggestion here that the littoral owners relied on or were 
surprised by the change.  Indeed, the Act was enacted in 1970, long before 
the 1987 court decision that is primarily relied on by the owners as 
precedent.  Furthermore, there was no evidence of when the owners 
actually acquired their lands.19  The landowners did not introduce any 
evidence of loss of value; it seems most likely that the state’s actions 
increased the value of their property by essentially ruling out the likelihood 
of erosion and providing an adjacent wide s 20andy beach.  
                                                                                                                                         
 16. Brief of Petitioner at 16–18, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Prot., No. 08-1151 (July 13, 2009).  The concept of a judicial taking is that a judicial change in the 
dimension of a common law property right might be analyzed as a regulatory taking in a manner similar 
to how courts analyze legislative limitations on property rights.  Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial 
Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1449–50 (1990). 
 17. Here are two examples.  First, courts have frequently changed the common law of property 
to adapt to new circumstances or understandings, even though such changes have inflicted harm on 
some owners.  See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 
at 31, 37 (1977) (discussing the transformation in the conception of property); Louise A. Halper, 
Nuisance, Courts and Markets in the New York Court of Appeals, 1850–1915, 54 ALB. L. REV. 301, 302–
03 (1990); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South 
Carolina Costal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1447–48 (1993).  The U.S. Constitution never has 
been, nor should it be, construed to give federal courts the authority to oversee or prevent this necessary 
legal adaptation.  Sauer v. New York, 206 U.S. 536, 546 (1907) (rejecting judicial takings argument).  
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court already has the doctrinal means to prevent state courts from frustrating 
federal rights through state law rulings that lack a “fair and substantial basis.”  Staub v. City of Baxley, 
355 U.S. 313, 318–19 (1958). 
 18. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d at 1102. 
 19. See id. (making no mention of when the land was acquired). 
 20. Id. at 1115. 
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The petitioners’ arguments in Stop the Beach Renourishment do not 
invoke key elements in regulatory takings doctrine.21  The state does not 
occupy any land that formerly had been private.  The owners do not claim 
that their property has suffered a great economic loss or that the Act 
surprised them; as such, their reasonable economic expectations have not 
been frustrated.  Nor do they argue that they have been deprived of a 
common law property interest explicitly bargained for, as in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon.22  Rather, they complain simply that they had enjoyed a 
common law right to accretion that has been eliminated by the Act and by 
the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling.23  It is a puzzle why such an argument 
should have any traction today.  No one disputes that the common law can 
be superseded by statute.24 
Severance v. Patterson presents a scenario just as likely to be relevant 
to sea level rise as Stop the Beach Renourishment, but adopts an opposite 
adaptation public policy: allowing natural forces to dictate the shape of the 
coastline.25  Texas follows the public trust law of the majority of states in 
holding that public ownership of the foreshore extends to the mean high 
tide or wet sand line.26  Following judicial clarification of this rule, in 1959 
the Texas legislature passed the Texas Open Beach Act (OBA), which 
provides: 
 
[I]f the public has acquired a right of use or easement to or 
over an area by prescription, dedication, or has retained a 
right by virtue of continuous right in the public, the public 
shall have the free and unrestricted right of ingress and 
egress to the larger area extending from the line of mean 
                                                                                                                                         
 21. Brief of Petitioner at 16–18, Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
No. 08-1151 (July 13, 2009). 
 22. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412 (1922).  In this original regulatory takings 
decision, legislation had deprived the Pennsylvania Coal Company of the very right to support that it 
had bargained for previously with the owner of the surface of the land. 
 23. Brief of Petitioner at 16–18, Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
No. 08-1151 (July 13, 2009). 
 24. “[C]ourts could not entertain a suggestion that legislation contrary to the doctrines of the 
common law is invalid.”  Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 396 
(1908).  For the hoary maxim that legislation in derogation of common law rights should be strictly 
construed, see, e.g., Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365, 367 (1797) (acknowledging the power of the 
legislature to change the common law and expressing conservative judicial suspicion of the legislature). 
 25. Severance v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 26. Id. 
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low tide to the line of vegetation bordering on the Gulf of 
Mexico.27 
The effect of such an approach is to enable courts to find the existence 
of public easements on the dry sand beaches.28  More to the point of this 
paper, these are “rolling easements” that move landward with the beach due 
to erosion or sea level rise, enabling state and local officials to bring actions 
seeking injunctions to force landowners to remove homes and other 
improvements from private land that has become beach and thus subject to 
the easement.29 
Severance also makes a big deal out of the common law origins of 
OBA.  To some extent, the OBA itself directs analytic focus to the common 
law, as its provisions turn on whether the public has enjoyed an easement 
on the state’s privately-owned beaches “by prescription, dedication, or has 
retained a right by virtue of continuous right in the public.”30  But Judge 
Jones treated as relevant whether the rolling nature of any easement existed 
at common law or was created by the OBA, both to any takings analysis 
and to her peculiar search and seizure approach.  For example, Judge Jones 
ruled that the owner’s takings claim was not ripe because presenting her 
claim in state court would not be futile, since it is unclear whether Texas 
courts would deny compensation to the landowner, as they have not issued 
a definitive ruling on whether the rolling nature of the easement comes 
from the common law or from the Act, “a critical component of takings 
analysis.”31 
It is important to note that the Texas scheme builds upon and expands 
the effect of the public trust doctrine.  Normal erosion or sea level rise will 
move the ownership boundary landward, and private land will become 
public when tide waters normally lap over it.  But the Texas beach 
easements roll landward in advance of complete public ownership and 
before water destroys houses and renders private land uninhabitable.  For 
this reason, Texas law interests environmentalists looking for means to 
                                                                                                                                         
 27. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.011(a) (Vernon 2001). 
 28. Very recently, Texas adopted through referendum an amendment enshrining the public right 
of access to the dry sand beach in the state constitution.  TEX. CONST. art. I, § 33(b). 
 29. See Feinman v. State, 717 S.W.2d 106, 107 (Tex. App. 1986) (demonstrating state and local 
enforcement of rolling easements). 
 30. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.012 (Vernon 2001). 
 31. Severance v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 490, 499 (5th Cir. 2009). 
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manage retreat before rising seawaters.32  And for this reason, Texas law 
has generated many regulatory takings challenges, all of which have been 
rejected by Texas appellate courts.33 
Before turning to the third approach to sea level rise, it will be helpful 
to consider the motives for the solicitude for common law rules reflected in 
the above two cases.  Most everyone acknowledges that “[g]overnment 
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not 
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”34  
There is something about how the common law shapes property rights that 
appeals to judges as a moral baseline.  I can think of three possible 
explanations. 
First, conservative theorists sometimes privilege judicial over 
legislative law-making on the ground that legislators respond to the self-
interested lobbying of special interests while judges have sufficient 
insulation to shape law based on principles such as efficiency or citizen 
autonomy.  The theoretical and empirical problems with this view are 
substantial, although sorting them out seems inappropriate for a brief paper 
such as this.35  It may be enough to say for the moment that its premise is 
undercut by the very theory of judicial takings upon which the Court 
granted certiorari in Stop the Beach Renourishment: courts (except this U.S. 
Supreme Court) cannot be trusted to preserve property rights!  Whatever 
the weaknesses of our democratic legislative process, it has important 
capacities superior to judicial lawmaking, such as “comprehensiveness, 
prospectivity, flexibility, capacity to create and fund institutions, democratic 
participation in rule formation, and the inclusion of more diffuse 
interests.”36  These virtues are important for aligning property rights with 
environmental and other communal interests.  “[T]here are a number of 
features of legislative decisionmaking that make it relatively more attractive 
                                                                                                                                         
 32. See, e.g., Caldwell and Segall, supra note 7, at 568 (discussing Texas law). 
 33. See, e.g., Arrington v. Mattox, 767 S.W.2d 957, 957–58 (Tex. App. 1989) (affirming 
summary judgment for the state in a regulatory takings case). 
 34. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
 35. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 149–50 (1994) (discussing judicial independence). 
 36. Byrne, supra note 9 (manuscript at 18–19).  Many of these observations date at least to the 
early twentieth century Progressives.  See, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 264–
67 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing for the superiority of legislation to judicial rulemaking in 
adapting intellectual property to new technologies); Pound, supra note 24, at 403–06 (discussing the 
benefits of legislation). 
2010] Rising Seas and Common Law Baselines 635 
than common-law decisionmaking as a basis for modifying or creating 
categories of property rights.”37 
Second, common property law rules sometimes are thought to embody 
natural law principles.  The U.S. Supreme Court itself has described the 
littoral owner’s right to accretion as vouchsafed by natural law: 
 
The riparian right to future alluvion is a vested right.  It is 
an inherent and essential attribute of the original property.  
The title to the increment rests in the law of nature.  It is 
the same with that of the owner of a tree to its fruits, and of 
the owner of flocks and herds to their natural increase.  The 
right is a natural, not a civil one.  The maxim “qui sentit 
onus debet sentire commodum” [he who enjoys the benefit 
ought also to bear the burdens] lies at its foundation.  The 
owner takes the chances of injury and of benefit arising 
from the situation of the property.  If there be a gradual 
loss, he must bear it; if a gradual gain, it is his.38 
One can understand the intuitive justice, all other things being equal, of 
allowing party A to obtain the benefit of random shifts in property 
boundaries if party A must tolerate losses from the same risk.  But these 
statutory adaptations to sea level rise address concerns far beyond a simple 
bilateral game.  The doctrine of accretion may have some weak normative 
appeal as a useful default, but only when no other ethical values or policy 
goals compete with it.  As Professor Sax’s historical scholarship shows, the 
early English cases fashioning the rule for littoral owners assumed that 
littoral owners would improve new alluvial land for grazing while the 
crown, the owner of the tidelands, would suffer no harm from the land 
passing into private ownership.39  In other words, it was seen as likely to 
make the littoral owner better off without injuring anyone else. 
Present littoral boundary issues arise in a vastly different natural and 
legal context.  Sea level rise will move boundaries in one direction—
landward—with minor variations.  This suspends the moral calculation 
                                                                                                                                         
 37. Thomas W. Merrill, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus 
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 61 (2000). 
 38. County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46, 68–69 (1874); see Nebraska v. 
Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 360–61 (1892) (discussing the right to accretion). 
 39. Jospeh L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2010). 
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upon which the appeal of an accretion rule stands.  More importantly, 
climate change and consequent sea level rise pose alarming challenges to 
environmental resources and public health and safety.40  The state has 
important, if sometimes conflicting, interests in protecting wetlands, sand 
dunes, habitat, storm buffers, and economic infrastructure.  Modern real 
estate development, despite its many benefits, has both contributed to 
climate change and made adjusting to it far more difficult.  At the same 
time, the state also has vastly greater scientific understanding, technological 
capacity, and organizational resources to address sea level rise than it did in 
the pre-modern era.  Modern legislation, appropriations, and administrative 
oversight provide far more powerful regulatory resources than common law 
adjudication.  While any statutory proposals should be scrutinized for 
fairness, any natural law arguments that turn on the common law origin of 
prior law should be dismissed. 
Third, libertarian lawyers embrace common law property rules 
precisely because older cases allow an owner more discretion.  Such 
lawyers distrust all efforts of the democratic state that diminish to any 
extent values incident to property and thus argue that all reductions in 
property rights must be compensated.41  Common law rules typically 
predate the administrative state, look primarily to the interests of litigants, 
and presume that judicial decisions through adjudication will be the 
principal means of law making.  They assume that legislative activity rarely 
will address underlying resource allocations.  Moreover, older decisions are 
blissfully ignorant of the types of environmental harms that the rational 
pursuit of self-interest can generate.  Thus, treating common law property 
rules as normative can delegitimize legislative innovations without coming 
to grips with their goals or substance. 
The Lucas decision remains the locus classicus of this method, where 
the Court equates background principles of property with common law 
nuisance rules.42  But nuisance litigation notoriously fails to adequately 
weigh the broad public interests present in environmental disputes.43  
                                                                                                                                         
 40. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2009), 
available at http:/dels.nas.edu/dels/rpt_briefs/ecological_impacts.pdf. 
 41. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO REVIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY 163–64 (2008) (arguing for the protection of 
private property). 
 42. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
 43. J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 
ECOLOGY L. Q. 89, 114–15 (1995). 
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Within the Lucas framework, shoreline protection legislation could be 
upheld if it replicated common law principles, but not on the basis that they 
implement reasonable and necessary protections for the environment and 
public safety.  Indeed, the appeal of enshrining the common law baseline 
seems to be that it avoids frank discussion of the public interests involved 
in environmental protection and the weight properly afforded to private 
interests of various sorts.  Property rights advocates fear environmental 
legislation because the proliferation of externalities and the threats to long 
term welfare threaten to justify dramatic incursion on private dominion over 
resources.  Invoking the common law is a way of obfuscating this reality 
and talking about something else. 
Another case that demonstrates judicial invocation of the common law 
to derail legislation without discussion of its fairness or efficiency is 
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation.44  The case considered a claim 
that IOLTA accounts, or trust funds in which lawyers are required to pool 
client funds too small to earn interest individually into accounts that earn 
cumulative interest and used to support indigent legal services, violate the 
Takings Clause.45  Phillips, rather bizarrely, addressed only whether the 
interest earned on such IOLTA accounts belongs to the client whose funds 
the lawyer deposits, even though those funds by definition were too meager 
to earn interest.  Even though positive state and federal law treated the 
interest earned under IOLTA accounts as owned by the entity that 
administered indigent legal representation, the Court resorted to the general 
common law rule that interest follows principal to hold that the owner of 
the principal in the IOLTA fund owns the interest.46  Fortunately for the 
administration of justice, the Court subsequently held that the compensation 
due the owner of the principal was zero.47  The latter decision highlights the 
ideal character of the first holding because it illustrates that the right found 
had been purely notional.  Both decisions were five to four.48 
It is striking that Phillips, like the shoreline cases, involves the principle 
of accession, i.e. that the new, small element is presumed to be part of the 
larger contiguous ownership.  One might think that the Rehnquist Court 
might be attaching natural law status to the broader principle of accession.  
                                                                                                                                         
 44. Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998). 
 45. Id. at 160. 
 46. Id. at 165, 168. 
 47. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 239–40 (2003). 
 48. Id. at 218–19; Phillips, 524 U.S. at 158. 
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But the greatest modern enthusiast for the principle of accession, Professor 
Tom Merrill, makes only a very qualified claim for it.  He finds it to 
promote efficiency (at least to a greater extent than the “first possession” 
principle) because it recognizes the prowess of the owner of the dominant 
asset by assigning him the gain.49  But this rationale has no purchase in the 
cases of shoreline accretions or IOLTA account interest; owners do not 
cause gains, which occur either by natural forces or through legislative 
innovation.  Merrill also recognizes several normative objections to 
accession.50  Thus, it is hard to see any normative principle in favor of 
accession as such that could justify a court giving it precedence over direct 
statutory directives.  The Court merely states that the common law rule 
must apply when in positive law it does not.  It changes the subject from the 
constitutional merits of the common law. 
With these considerations in mind, let us turn to the barriers this 
attachment to common law baselines imposes on a third statutory approach 
that is prominently discussed by others for adapting to sea rise caused by 
climate warming: mandating retreat of development in order to permit 
wetlands and sand dunes to be re-established landward.  Any such policy 
would be applied selectively to rural coastlines where dunes and marshes 
already exist and would be justified by the ecological essentiality of such 
natural features for water quality, fisheries, and storm protection.  The 
statute at issue in Lucas broadly can be understood as such a measure; it 
prohibited construction of a permanent structure seaward of a line plausibly 
expected to be underwater in a few years.51 
For present purposes, consider a state statute less immediately and 
severely restrictive.  Commentators have suggested that all the law need do 
to ensure a policy of retreat is to prohibit “armoring,” that is erection of 
erosion control structures such as levees and jetties.52  Such laws 
predictably will permit rising sea levels to deprive some private owners of 
their land.  The land will be flooded and thus rendered unusable.  
Government authorization of flooding of private property generally 
                                                                                                                                         
 49. Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 461, 
489 (2009). 
 50. Id. at 470–74. 
 51. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280 
to 290 (2008). 
 52. See Caldwell & Segall, supra note 7, at 570–74 (discussing several such state statutes). 
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amounts to a taking.53  Moreover, the public trust doctrine transfers 
ownership of submerging lands to state ownership as rising waters move 
the boundary line landward, which creates an effect resembling inverse 
condemnation. 
Yet, there are substantial arguments against treating an anti-armoring 
statute as causing a regulatory taking.  Such a statute would prohibit 
construction that could harm other property owners and the environment 
generally.  Shoreline fortifications force rising water elsewhere, increasing 
the flooding of areas that are not protected by such defenses.  The statute 
under discussion arguably solves a prisoner’s dilemma, taking away some 
of the pressure to armor that all would feel in the absence of the statute or 
an improbable agreement among many littoral owners, making coastal area 
property owners, as a group, better off.54  Armoring would also force rising 
waters onto existing wetlands and prevent reestablishment of wetlands in 
geologically suitable locations further inland, thus seriously reducing the 
quantity of wetlands in violation of long-standing cornerstones of 
environmental policy.  These factors should weigh in any analysis.  In this 
regard, one should note that the Lucas per se rule would not apply, as 
littoral owners’ land would continue to be used and valuable for several 
years after the prohibition and before the waters rise.  Owners would not 
lose all of the present value of their land. 
Most importantly, the destruction of the owner’s estate will result from 
sea level rise, not the statute, which only forbids a defensive device to 
postpone the problem but imposes substantial harms on others.  Littoral 
owners may have nuisance claims against large emitters of greenhouse 
gases.55  Indeed, they might have a more sympathetic claim against the 
United States for failing to curb emissions than against the government 
enacting the probation of armoring, although I know of no precedent for a 
government omission (rather than an act) providing a basis for a takings 
claim.  Similarly, the exchange of ownership from the private owners to the 
                                                                                                                                         
 53. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1871). 
 54. See Caldwell & Segall, supra note 7, at 574–75 (discussing the economic benefits of 
restrictions on armoring). 
 55. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 310 (2d Cir. 2009) 
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government under the public trust doctrine would be the result of natural 
forces, not legal will.  Moreover, the private owners’ erection of defenses 
can be seen to invade the rights of the sovereign to gain by sea level rise.  
As the court recently held in United States v. Milner, “because both the 
upland and tideland owners [the Lummi Indian tribe] have a vested right to 
gains from the ambulation of the boundary, the Homeowners cannot 
permanently fix the property boundary, thereby depriving the Lummi of 
tidelands that they would otherwise gain.”56 
One issue that property owners likely will raise is that such a statute 
deprives littoral owners of their common law right to wall out the sea.  At 
common law, a landowner could erect a sea wall to protect against erosion 
and was not liable for the diversion of the waters onto the land of his 
neighbors, a variant of the common enemy rule for casual surface water.57  
Reflecting the view embedded within Stop the Beach Renourishment and 
Severance, upland owners could claim that the right to armor the coastline 
is inherent in littoral title, so that a statute prohibiting it deprives them of 
their property right.58  Indeed, in two significant modern cases involving 
construction of sea walls, state supreme courts have had to resort to creative 
interpretations of state common law to reject landowners’ claims that they 
had a common law right to wall out seawater.59  In Shell Island 
Homeowners Association v. Tomlinson, the North Carolina Court of Appeals 
rejected the property owners’ constitutional challenge to a state statute 
                                                                                                                                         
 56. United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1187 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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Grundy v. Thurston County, 117 P.3d 1089, 1090 (Wash. 2005). 
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prohibiting construction of seawalls.60  The property owners based their 
takings claim on the argument that “the protection of property from erosion 
is an essential right of property owners.”61  The court summarily rejected 
the argument as having “no support in the law,” although Professor Kalo, 
while highly sympathetic to the policy of the statute, commented that “the 
issue of whether waterfront property owners have any common law right to 
erect hardened structures in statutorily designated areas of environmental 
concern is not as simple as the court makes it appear.”62 
In the other case, Grundy v. Thurston County, the Washington Supreme 
Court held that the common enemy rule did not apply to seawater, despite 
language in prior decisions strongly suggesting that it did.63  Thus, these 
courts had to sift moldy common law precedents to find some accordance 
with contemporary statutory approaches, much in the same way as the court 
did in Stop the Beach Renourishment.  Similar to that case, the buildings at 
issue in Shell Island were permitted after the regulations challenged were 
adopted, so that unfair surprise was not at issue.  The displacement of 
common law was advanced as an independent ground for the invalidity of 
the challenged statutory approach, so that courts felt that they had to 
interpret the common law not to include the rule. 
The purpose of this essay is to argue that courts should not need to 
worry about the old common law rule, adopted under vastly different 
assumptions.  No constitutional or jurisprudential principle gives it 
precedence over the subsequent statute.  There may be circumstances where 
a ban on armoring might constitute a regulatory taking, for example, where 
the prior law had led an owner to rely on a legal right to armor that was 
taken away suddenly resulting in a wipeout.  In such circumstances, it 
should not matter whether the baseline rule was common law or statutory, 
nor whether the change was a new statute or a clear change in the common 
law.  Moreover, even if not a constitutional violation, a new statutory 
prohibition may authorize some compensation for reasons of either fairness 
or politics.  There may be unfairness to littoral owners from the application 
of a common law rule shifting boundaries with the mean high tide line 
when sea level rise creates a one-way shift.  The one point argued here is 
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that the replacement of a common law rule with a statutory one, as such, 
should have no bearing on whether a regulatory taking has occurred. 
